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Introduction 
 
In January 2011, at the request of the internationally acknowledged elected president 
Ouattara, an embargo was imposed by the EU and other countries on imports from Côte 
d'Ivoire. The initial call for an embargo was for one month, but it was extended on 22 
February to mid March. De facto, no cocoa was exported from Côte d'Ivoire in February. 
Only towards the end of March were shipments of cocoa beans from Côte d'Ivoire again 
possible. 
Subsequently, world market prices in January and February 2011, and in the early days of 
March 2011 rose to levels that had not been seen on the New York futures market for the last 
32 years, reaching a level of $ 3674 per tonne. Average prices in January-March 2011 were 
12% above those of the previous quarter. In the same quarter, according to official data, 
average prices paid to producers in Côte d'Ivoire fell by (only) 2%.  Exports of cocoa from 
Côte d'Ivoire came to a standstill according to ICCO’s monthly reports. Yet imports into 
Europe from Côte d'Ivoire did not fall so much: in February, March and April, cocoa bean 
imports into the EU27 fell by some 20% compared to the average of the preceding 5 years, 
whereas 2011 as a whole scored 20% higher import levels. The downfall in the early months 
was compensated for between May and September, notably in July 2011, when more than 
twice the normal July quantity was imported. Total beans imports into the EU for the period 
February-April 2011 were 3% below the average levels of the preceding five years, whereas 
annual imports in 2011 were 11% above this level. 
According to the monthly reviews of the ICCO, stock levels of cocoa in certified warehouses 
in Europe decreased during February 2011 by 20 thousand tonnes to 223 thousand tonnes, but 
in the USA they increased by 29 thousand tonnes (to 227 thousand tonnes). At the end of 
April, these stock levels stood at 209 and 220 thousand tonnes, respectively, and at the end of 
June 167 and 235 thousand tonnes.
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In this paper we try to find out who eventually paid for this embargo. To do so, we investigate 
the responses by prices of cocoa beans on the supply side in Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere, and 
on the demand side, notably in the EU. Further downstream effects on prices (and volumes) of  
cocoa and chocolate products are ignored. Cocoa product prices could have easily been 
affected, but we shall show that in the early months of 2011 prices of cocoa butter and powder 
simply followed the trends started in 2009: upward for powder, downward (and mostly in line 
with the trend for beans) for butter. 
 
Potential effects are the following: 
For producers in Côte d'Ivoire, the prices are likely to have fallen dramatically, as traders had 
less incentives to buy in view of the limited export possibilities. Thus prices should reflect the 
likely extra storage costs (and potential deterioration), or the extra transport costs when 
exported through Ghana, Togo or Benin. In addition, the uncertainty facing the exporters must 
have affected the producer prices too. 
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Producers in other countries may have temporarily benefitted, provided the higher world 
market prices are transmitted to them. 
Cocoa processors faced temporarily higher prices for beans that (apparently) could hardly be 
translated into higher prices for cocoa products. They would typically pay these higher prices 
in order to secure sufficient supply to their processing plants. Demand for their products may 
have been enhanced by the reduction in exports of cocoa products from Côte d'Ivoire, but they 
themselves faced a reduced supply of beans. 
 
 
1. World market 
 
Monthly world market prices typically do not reflect demand and supply in the normal sense 
of economic models. The monthly production, or the monthly consumption do not directly 
feature among the factors that influence prices. The prices are established at futures markets 
and mostly reflect expectations held by stockholders and other stakeholders, including pure 
speculators, about future developments in the market. To the extent that monthly data on 
production and consumption influence these expectations they do play a role. We give a 
simple model to reflect this. 
Monthly demand for cocoa beans by the cocoa processing sector can be represented by an 
error-correction model in which this month’s demand can deviated from the long-run 
requirements in response to current prices but at the cost of a stronger urge to return to the 
long-run path in later months. The long-run demand for cocoa products typically depends on 
demand for chocolate products and other final products containing cocoa. 
 
In its simplest form, the equation would read 
 
(1) )( 1210 tttt yybpbby    
 
where yt stands for demand for beans in month t, pt for its price and ty for the long-run level 
of monthly demand, as expected in month t.  
Prospects for demand are closely followed in the trade literature, exchange rates matter, and 
above all, income developments are an important factor for final demand for products 
containing cocoa. In the period of the embargo, the outlook for demand for chocolate was not 
particularly strong in Europe, due to the financial crisis, but somewhat better in the USA and 
in emerging economies. The latter countries typically exert a greater demand for cocoa 
powder than for cocoa butter. Long-run demand for cocoa products is sensitive to prices but 
cocoa prices form only a small part of the final consumer costs of the products. 
Seasonal factors matter for demand, as demand in the Christmas and Easter periods is 
typically higher, but production for these periods is normally spread over many months. 
 
On the supply side, the exporters from countries other than Côte d'Ivoire, face a similar 
situation in the sense that their long-run supply is dictated by the trees, the age structure 
thereof, weather conditions and by the local prices, linked to the world market prices via 
exchange rates and affected by trade policies.  
The short-run export supply depends on the timing of the month in the harvesting season, and 
will eventually, and cumulatively, equal annual supply. There is normally a stock of cocoa 
waiting, or on its way to be exported. Whatever they supply in excess of the long-run 
(monthly) supply, must at some point be compensated by less supply later-on. 
Thus the same error-correction mechanism is in place. Again, in a basic form: 
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where x stands for supply. 
 
A monthly price change results from confronting demand and supply. The monthly changes in 
demand and supply need not be equal in every month but should do so in the long run. Hence  
we should have ttt yx  , so that for the change in prices an expression results  
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Equation (3) shows that prices go up by more if  
a) the long-run demand prospects improve or the long-run outlook for supply deteriorates 
b) previous deviations from the long-run demand (supply) are greater (smaller) 
c) a sudden increase in demand or decrease in supply takes place  
 
The continuously changing outlook for demand and the emerging insights into the yearly 
supply from major producing countries thus have an impact on the monthly prices and so does 
the extent to which the recent monthly demand or supply is in line with this outlook. Over the 
months, the long-run outlook changes: more and more data become available on the 
production of the cocoa, fundamentals behind demand develop over time etc. Such news 
affects monthly prices. An improvement in the outlook for production, for example, causes tx
to rise, depressing the price in proportion to the extent that recent supply 1tx did not reflect 
this. 
 
The embargo amounts to a sudden drop in the short-term supply without so much affecting 
the long-run outlook. In fact, in 2011, the supply outlook evolved more and more into the 
positive, with high levels of production recorded for Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, and a 
somewhat lower production in Indonesia. That is, the tx  variable gradually became higher, by 
itself exerting a negative effect on the price.  
The short-term drop in supply, amounting to a temporary fall in a0, pushes up the prices, and 
thereby – via equation (1) – lowers the change in demand. For the next period, we should 
therefore expect to have a lower (or more negative) deviation between actual and long-run 
demand which would translate into higher price changes in period t+1. These higher prices 
normally encourage higher levels of supply and reduce the deviation between actual and long-
run supply. If – as in our case – the temporary drop in supply continues for another month, 
prices may still go up. After the embargo ends, it is the balance of the effects of the two 
deviations (on the demand side and on the supply side) that determines the direction of the 
price change. There is some cumulative ‘recovery’ demand, as well as a cumulated deviation 
between recent and long-term supply, and there is the cumulated stock in Côte d'Ivoire, 
waiting to be supplied. The resulting effect of these forces on the prices is likely to be 
negative. Note, that this negative effect is largely the result of the expectation that more 
supply is forthcoming, because little was offered in the previous months (and the long-run 
supply outlook assumedly remained the same). 
 
2. Domestic market in Côte d'Ivoire  
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The price that producers in Côte d'Ivoire receive for their cocoa is in normal times directly 
linked to the world market price, although with a large, and rather variable wedge formed by 
taxes and levies and costs of transportation etc. 
How should producer prices respond to an embargo? We answer this question by looking a 
the position of a trader. Suppose traders normally face transport and other costs of r per kg. 
Assume for simplicity that transport takes a month and that cocoa collected in month t can be 
exported in month t+1. The trader can hold stocks but incurs costs equal to ctz where zt is the 
level of stocks at the start of the month t and c is the exponent, with c>1.  
The trader then makes a profit equal to 
t
c
tt
b
ttt rxzxpyp   
or  
(4) t
c
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that is: profits equal revenues (at price pt) minus expenditures on purchases (at price
b
tp ) 
minus storage costs and transport costs. 
A quantity that is bought in the previous month, if met by an equal volume sold this month, 
does not affect stock levels. If more was bought than is sold, stocks increase and these 
additional costs should be met by higher margin between the buying price and the selling 
price. The marginal contribution of extra purchases of cocoa in month t to the profits over 
time thus depends on the expectation as to when this quantity can be sold. Sales in period t+1 
contribute to profits according to: 
(5) 111
1





 c
tt
t
czp
y
profit
 
That is, every kilogram sold brings in pt+1 plus the marginal reduction in storage costs. Every 
kilogram bought in month t adds to the profits: 
(6) ...)1( 12
11
1 

 



c
t
t
tc
t
b
t
t
cz
x
y
posczrp
x
profit
 
Here, the expression pos(1-yt+1/xt) equals the share of xt which is not sold in t+1, and is equal 
to the value of 0 if all (or more) is sold. 
 
Equation (6) shows that extra purchases bring extra costs equal to the buying price plus 
transport cost plus marginal addition to the stocks plus (in case not all can be sold) the 
marginal storage costs one month later. If the quantity xt is not even sold by then, further 
storage costs are attributed to this purchase. 
Comparison of (5) and (6) shows that if all is sold the next month, the buying price should be 
equal to the selling price minus r. In periods where more is bought than can be sold 
immediately, storage costs enter the margin between selling and buying prices and the latter 
will fall relative to the relevant world market price. Relevant prices here are the prices in the 
month in which the original quantity is sold; hence if it can only be sold two month later, than 
it is this price in t+3 that forms the point of reference. 
 
To reflect the embargo conditions, purchases in month t (with embargo) cannot be expected to 
be sold in the next month, so that the balance of selling and buying price should now also 
account for the marginal storage costs for one month. If the embargo is expected to last longer 
than a month, the buying price falls by another month’s marginal storage costs, which will be 
even higher if the stocks meanwhile have grown. 
 
Cocoa producers may respond to lower prices by producing less. For annual production 
levels, there is ample evidence of a small, but positive, price elasticity, but for monthly 
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reactions no such reference exists. Farmers are likely to harvest less if prices are low, by 
spending less effort on harvesting, and on harvesting timely. The months that are relevant 
here, however, form the end of the major harvesting season, and while this makes responses 
to price falls more likely, no large volumes of cocoa production are involved. 
 
3. Combining domestic and world market 
 
The onset of the embargo in January 2011, could have an upward effect on the world market 
prices according to (3), possibly followed by another upward shift in the second month when 
the embargo continued. Upon the ending of the embargo, the expectation that supply would 
compensate for the earlier shortfall, may cause lower-than-average prices even though this 
was combined with higher recovery demand (due to the price-induced reductions in short-
term demand). In the case of 2011, this was also influenced by the emerging recognition of a 
fairly large crop for the cocoa year 2010-2011. 
Domestically in Côte d'Ivoire, prices paid to producers should have fallen initially by the 
storage costs for one month, but taken relative to the post-embargo price. This price is, ceteris 
paribus, lower than the pre-embargo price because of the higher expected supply by then. If 
more time elapses before the purchased cocoa can be sold, more storage costs and lower post-
embargo prices exert a further downward pressure on the prices. 
Of course, Ivorian producers can respond to this, and reduce their harvesting labour. This will 
mitigate the expectations for larger post-embargo supply. On the other hand, producers in 
countries where the higher (embargo-period) prices are transmitted to them will increase their 
supply. This makes up for some of the short-fall during the embargo, but is also likely to add 
to the post-embargo glut. 
 
The possible income effects of the embargo consist of 
 higher costs to processors during the embargo, compensate by lower costs later-on 
 higher revenues to international stockholders (perhaps combined with lower storage 
costs) during the embargo, compensated by lower revenues (and possibly higher 
storage costs) later-on 
 higher revenues for producers outside Côte d'Ivoire during the embargo and lower 
prices later-on, to the extent that prices are transmitted 
 higher costs to traders within Côte d'Ivoire during the embargo until stocks returned 
to normal levels, but possibly largely compensated by lower buying prices 
 lower revenues of producers in Côte d'Ivoire, to the extent that higher storage costs 
and bleaker price-outlook are reflected in the prices they received during the 
embargo; afterwards their prices did not recover fully as the world market price was 
lower by then due to the extra supply. 
 
Theoretically, therefore, we see that the embargo likely hurt producers and traders within Côte 
d'Ivoire most; it could lead to a temporary hump in costs for processors but followed by a 
(similar?) dip; and could mean a small boon for those who held international stocks at the on-
set of the embargo and producers outside Côte d'Ivoire. 
  
4. Confronting theory with empirics  
 
For the calculation of possible effects on the demand side, and of what could be the expected 
post-embargo price, we first turn to the world market. 
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What were relevant considerations for those that traded cocoa in January 2011? At the 
London and New York markets, the nearest delivery month is March. These are also the 
prices that form the base prices for the ICCO daily indicator price. Hence, the ‘world market 
price’ that responded to the embargo is the futures price for delivery by March 2011. Such 
‘delivery’ (between apostrophes as physical delivery is rarely required) is potentially 
threatened by the embargo: some 40% of all traded cocoa comes from Côte d'Ivoire, and an 
embargo starting mid-January can affect supplies reaching the warehouses before March. 
Normally, some 10% of the annual imports from Côte d'Ivoire arrive in February (14% in 
January) in the EU; if half of this would be affected by the embargo (the other half being at 
sea when the embargo commenced), some 25 000 tons would not reach Europe on time, 
which is around a fifth of total monthly beans imports into the EU. Even when arrivals in the 
next month are uncertain, these amounts may appear small in comparison with the stocks in 
certified warehouses. These levels stood at 223 thousand tonnes in European warehouses at 
the end of February 2011. Hence, on this basis, no substantial rise in the (nearby) futures 
should have been expected from the embargo. An additional element is however the increased 
uncertainty about the prices. This uncertainty by itself might have led stock holders to hedge 
more than they otherwise would, thus temporarily increasing demand for futures contracts and 
thereby the price. 
 
As it happened, prices in January, February and March were substantially above the levels 
that prevailed in earlier months. 
To quantify the effect, we followed two approaches, one based on the futures prices, as 
reported by ICCO and IMF in US dollars, and one based on the actual values of imports of 
beans in the Netherlands in Euros. 
We estimated prices in month t in relation to their past three months, a trend, and dummy 
variables for the months of the year, using data from January 1999 until December 2011. 
Table 1 gives the outcomes for the estimated coefficients. 
 
Table 1. Regression outcomes for world market prices 
 dependent variable   
 Unit import  World  
 value NL €/t market $/t  
 Coef St. Dev. Coef St. Dev. 
p(t-1) 0.69 0.09 1.24 0.09 
p(t-2) 0.31 0.10 -0.40 0.14 
p(t-3) -0.04 0.09 0.10 0.09 
Trend 4.20 3.12 9.91 6.12 
Jan 104.67 39.66 -82.08 50.60 
Feb 82.97 40.34 -20.50 51.08 
Mar 77.48 40.08 -130.37 50.02 
Apr 84.46 38.79 -109.98 48.80 
May 34.90 39.02 -110.25 47.87 
Jun 68.31 38.55 -49.98 47.82 
Jul 57.43 38.94 -51.26 48.16 
Aug 59.43 38.69 -132.57 48.65 
Sep 23.90 38.74 -84.30 48.58 
Oct 57.31 38.49 -134.44 47.88 
Nov 10.58 38.86 -109.88 47.94 
intercept -48.77 43.40 54.94 58.91 
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Based on this regression, we generated the prices that would have prevailed in 2011 by 
replacing the lagged values of the prices that appear on the RHS by their successive predicted 
values. This generates a ‘counterfactual’ price and the deviation between the actual prices and 
this dynamic simulation gives an indication of the possible effect that the embargo has had on 
the world market prices. Figure 1 shows the deviation in prices that occurred in the first 9 
months of 2011. After September 2011, a new cocoa year starts and we considered the effects 
to have disappeared. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 1a,b Cocoa beans import prices The Netherlands, one-month forecast, and dynamic simulation 
2011;  Percentage deviation in 2011 between actual and dynamic simulation. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figures 2a,b Cocoa beans market prices ICCO, one-month forecast, and dynamic simulation 2011;  
Percentage deviation in 2011 between actual and dynamic simulation. 
 
The estimated deviations are relative to the values that would have prevailed in 2011 in case 
no disturbances in the prices had occurred. The embargo is one of the possible disturbances. 
Hence the deviations may overestimate the effects of the embargo to the extent that other 
disturbances worked in the same direction. The two price series differ in two important 
respects: one is that market prices lead import prices by about a month, the other is that the 
Dutch import prices are in Euros and the world market prices in US dollars. The effects that 
could be due to the embargo are initially quite similar: Dutch import prices may have risen by 
up to 6% in March, and world market prices by up to 8% in February. The following months 
show very limited effects on the world market prices, while Dutch import prices fell 
particularly in July 2011 (-6.6%). Note that the residual standard deviations in the two 
regressions were €98 and $123, or 6.2% and 6.4% for the Dutch and the market data, 
respectively. Hence, estimated deviations were hardly significant.  
 8 
Share Côte d'Ivoire in EU imports 2011
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The difference in the downward deviations later in the year, July in particular, can be 
explained by the nature of the two series. World market prices are for well-defined qualities, 
while imports pertain to all types of bean. July was a month with extremely high levels of 
imports, much of it coming from Côte d'Ivoire. And the quality (and therefore the price) of 
Ivorian exports was affected by the decision of Ivorian authority to “ease the export 
requirements for mid-crop beans to 125 beans per 100 grammes instead of the normal 
standard of 105 beans.”(ICCO monthly market review, June 2011).  
These lower prices can also be seen as a consequence of the embargo, as it helped Côte 
d'Ivoire to export the large stock of cocoa beans (ICCO’s monthly market review mentions 
half a million tons), that had accumulated in the ports. Figure 3 shows how the shortfall in EU 
imports from Côte d'Ivoire (normally some 34% of all EU cocoa beans imports) in the early 
months of 2011 was compensated for in the summer months. The import data do not show, 
however, that Ivorian cocoa was particularly cheaper than other cocoa: imports from Côte 
d'Ivoire entered into the EU or the Netherlands at prices that were some 3-5% below the 
average price for the month and this held for all months of 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 changes in the Ivorian import share, EU (Eurostat) 
 
Effects within Côte d'Ivoire  
We now return to the effects on producer prices and we start with Côte d'Ivoire. The 
theoretical model would charge the producers for the longer storage of the beans, and it would 
relate the producer prices to the expected selling prices, that would prevail after the embargo.  
The post-embargo price can be derived from the Dutch price series and suggests that the 
cocoa that was bought during the embargo was eventually sold at prices that were some 5% 
below the normal prices.  
 
To understand the other factors that  depressed the producer price, we need to know the costs 
of storing cocoa for some extra months. An estimate of the extra storage costs has a high 
degree of uncertainty. The 2003 report to which BNETD contributed (Agkpo et al., 2005) 
documented the costs of storage (for 45 days) to be around 5% of the CIF value of cocoa 
(FCFA 57 out of 1193). These costs may increase with the volume that is stored. We take this 
5% as representing the storage costs for one month in 2011. A decrease in prices at the export 
level by 5% may translate into much stronger decrease in producer prices: in more normal 
times, say 2010, producer prices were some 60% of the export price, and 5% of the latter 
price equals, therefore, 8.3% of the producer price. Two months additional storage alone 
would then lead to a fall in producer prices by 17%.  
In addition, the basis for calculating producer prices shifts from what would be the likely 
price in the next month to the likely price three months ahead, and it would hinge on the 
assumption that the embargo would be ended by then with effects on the price level. This 
effect we estimated above to be (at most) 5%. 
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Adding this 5% to the 8% discount per month of additional storage, and taking three months 
to be the average longer duration of storage, one should expect that producer prices came out 
at levels that were lower by about 30% of the export price, or (at 60% ratio of producer to 
export price) at 50% lower producer prices. That is, if traders had anticipated the duration of 
the embargo and its negative effect on subsequent prices correctly. 
 
Producer price data were collected on a monthly basis by a team of the second author in the 
village of Ouragahio, close to Gagnoa in Côte d'Ivoire. Figure 4 shows the producer prices as 
share of the world market prices. In 2010, they amounted to some 60% of the world market 
price, but in 2011 the village prices fell to below 30% of this price in March, April before 
recovering to around 40% by September. This fall in prices is in line with the theory as 
explained above. In absolute terms, prices prevailing at the end of 2010 were close to 800 
Cfa/kg and slid down to Cfa 404 per kg in April 2011. By September they had recovered to 
Cfa 511 per kg.  
For the income of the producers, this fall in prices was hard, but most of their crop had 
already been sold: the peak production period is October-December and this crop they had 
sold at reasonable prices. In the months of February-March, they normally harvest the last 
pods of the main crop, about 3-10% of their total annual crop. In the months of April-August, 
they normally harvest the mid-crop that generates about 15% of their total annual crop in the 
old cocoa regions (slightly more in new pioneer regions where trees are younger and benefit 
more abundant rainfall, but these cases represent a low percentage of production and farmers). 
In addition, in 2010/11, due to an exceptionally favourable rainfall pattern, the harvest was 
abundant and came earlier than a normal year. Finally, at this stage, there is no evidence of 
famers producing less in response to the low prices. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Producer prices in Ouragahio, Côte d'Ivoire as share of world market price.  
 
Some confirmation of the low prices is given by the official price data from Côte d'Ivoire. The 
ICCO furnished the data on quarterly basis. Producer prices in the first three quarters of 2011, 
were 864, 669 and 604 franc per kg, which is not quite as low as reported in our village, but 
still more than 25% below prices prevailing at the end of 2010. These prices, however, are 
allegedly collected at the primary market level, at which prices are higher than at the very 
producer level. 
CI producer share WM price
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
J
a
n
-1
0
M
a
r-
1
0
M
a
y
-1
0
J
u
l-
1
0
S
e
p
-1
0
N
o
v
-1
0
J
a
n
-1
1
M
a
r-
1
1
M
a
y
-1
1
J
u
l-
1
1
S
e
p
-1
1
rel. to original WM price rel. to simulated WM price
 10 
-  
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
3.00 
Ja
n
-1
0
Fe
b
-1
0
M
ar
-1
0
A
p
r-
1
0
M
ay
-1
0
Ju
n
-1
0
Ju
l-
1
0
A
u
g-
1
0
Se
p
-1
0
O
ct
-1
0
N
o
v-
1
0
D
ec
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
Fe
b
-1
1
M
ar
-1
1
A
p
r-
1
1
M
ay
-1
1
Ju
n
-1
1
Ju
l-
1
1
A
u
g-
1
1
Se
p
-1
1
U
S 
$
 /
 k
g
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
Sulawesi (Noling) Côte d'Ivoire (Ouragahio)
WMprice (right axis)
 
This price development for producers can be compared with that for cocoa producers in 
Indonesia. Monthly data on prices were collected in the village of Noling in South Sulawesi. 
Figure 5 shows the prices in this village, translated into US$/kg, and set against prices in Côte 
d'Ivoire (also at the left axis, also translated into US$/kg) and at the world market (right axis).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Producer prices and world market price of cocoa, 2010-2011 
 
Figure 5 shows how closely the producer prices in Sulawesi track the developments at the 
world market. When the world market prices edged upwards at the start of the embargo in 
January 2011, so did the Indonesian producer prices. 
 
5. Combining losers and winners 
 
We can now sketch the whole picture, at least in terms of price changes. A general comment 
is still in order: it is not certain that the changes in prices can (completely) be ascribed to the 
embargo, as other influences are not ruled out. 
 
Among the gainers are the farmers in other parts of the world, including Indonesia. Their 
gains are some 5% of their production value in the months of February and March 2011. In 
Ghana, the world’s second cocoa producer, the higher world market prices were not 
transmitted to the farmers, as Cocobod kept its recommended buying price unchanged. 
 
Other gainers, at least initially, are those that held stocks at the start of the embargo which 
gained in value due to the higher world market prices. The European stocks in certified 
warehouses stood at 262 thousand tons at the end of 2010. They still held 167 thousand tons 
by the end of June 2011; this volume is some 100 thousand tonnes less than what was stored 
in June 2010. Hence, sales from stocks could have been 100 thousand tons larger than 
otherwise would have been the case. These extra sales are a gain only when they are made at 
prices higher than those at which they were bought or are replenished. This is probable in 
view of the higher prices prevailing when stocks were high than when stocks were low. 
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Those that suffered from the embargo are on the demand side, namely those that paid 
(slightly) higher prices for cocoa, without being able to translate this into higher prices for the 
products they sold. It appears that European cocoa processors are in this group. Prices of 
cocoa products such as cocoa butter, powder and paste did not show movements similar to 
those of beans. Figure 6 shows this for Dutch imports of beans and exports of powder and 
butter. 
 
 
Figure 6. Netherlands’ unit import and export values (€/ton), beans (right axis), powder, butter 
 
The gross margin between the combined butter and powder price and the beans price fell from 
January to March 2011 from €2890 to €2325, but such levels had also prevailed during most 
of 2009. 
 
Important losers were those in Côte d'Ivoire who held stocks at the onset of the embargo. 
They may have bought at prices of say Cfa 800/kg, then were forced to stock this for some 
three months, and could sell it after the embargo ended at prices which did not cover these 
extra costs. According to ICCO (Monthly market review, June 2011) about half a million 
tonnes was accumulated at the ports of Côte d'Ivoire, of which 200 thousand tonnes appears to 
have arrived there during the embargo. 
 
Finally, the group that experienced the strongest decline in prices were the Ivorian farmers. 
Their prices fell by some 50% in March and April 2011 and did not fully recover before the 
start of the next season. Small comfort was, that their main crop had already been sold. The 
mid-crop has, however, gained in importance over the last decade. Witness to this is that 
reported arrivals at the ports in Côte d'Ivoire stood at almost 900 thousand tonnes at the end of 
January 2011 while the cocoa year ended with a total (record) production of 1511 thousand 
tonnes. An important share of total production was therefore likely bought at very low farm 
gate prices, rendering them probably the main victims of the embargo. 
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